COMPUTATIONAL LEARNING IN DYNAMIC LOGICS DAY 4: ITERATED BELIEF REVISION AND LEARNABILITY

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@NASSLLI, June 2025

Course Homepage:

https://sites.google.com/view/nasslli25-learning-in-del

PLAN FOR TODAY

Learnability in Epistemic Spaces

2 Learning Power of Belief Revision Operators

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
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- a topological characterisation of learnability and solvability;
- a modal dynamic logic of learnability.

EPISTEMIC SPACES AND OBSERVABLES

Definition

An **epistemic space** is a pair S = (S, O) consisting of a state space S and a set of observables $O \subseteq P(S)$, both at most countable.



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We assume that data streams are sound and complete.

LEARNING: LEARNERS AND CONJECTURES

Definition


Let $\mathbb{S} = (S, O)$ be an epistemic space and let $O_0, \dots, O_n \in \mathbb{O}$.

A **learner** is a function L that on the input of $\mathbb S$ and data sequence (O_0,\ldots,O_n) outputs some set of worlds


$$L(\mathbb{S},(O_0,\ldots,O_n))\subseteq S$$

We call this the learner's **conjecture**.


AN INTUITION ABOUT SEPARABILITY BY OBSERVATIONS



(a) t and u are not separable



(b) weakly separated space T0



(c) strongly separated space T1

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
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
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
 $\mathbb{S} = (S, O)$ is **learnable by** L if for every state $s \in S$ and for every sound and complete data stream \vec{O} for s, there is $n \in \mathbb{N}$ such that:


$$L(\mathbb{S}, \vec{O}[k]) = \{s\} \text{ for all } k \ge n.$$


An epistemic space S is **learnable** if it is learnable by a learner L.























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Learning and belief revision go their separate ways

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
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- What are the principles of these dynamics?

LONG-TERM LEARNING AND BELIEF REVISION

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
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Truth-tracking!

PLAUSIBILITY SPACES

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Knowledge and Belief

$$\mathbb{B}_{\mathbb{S}} \vDash Kp \quad \text{iff} \quad S \subseteq p$$

$$\mathbb{B}_{\mathbb{S}} \vDash Bp \quad \text{iff} \quad \min_{\leq} S \subseteq p.$$

BELIEF-REVISION METHODS

Definition

A **belief-revision method** is a function R that, for any plausibility space $\mathbb{B}_{\mathbb{S}} = (S, O, \leq)$ and any observation O outputs a new plausibility space:

$$R(\mathbb{B}_{\mathbb{S}}, O) := (S', O, \leq').$$

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A belief revision R can be iterated in the following way:

$$R(\mathbb{B}_{\mathbb{S}}, \sigma * O) := R(R(\mathbb{B}_{\mathbb{S}}, \sigma), O)$$

where σ is a finite sequence of observations.

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Some motivation for considering plausibility spaces:

- Belief Revision: minimal states give beliefs.
- Computational Learning Theory: co-learning, learning by erasing.
- Philosophy of Science: Ockham's razor.

CONDITIONING


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LEXICOGRAPHIC UPGRADE

 Lexicographic upgrade rearranges the preorder by putting all worlds satisfying the observation to be more plausible than others.

MINIMAL UPGRADE

 Minimal upgrade rearranges the preorder by making only the most plausible states satisfying the observation more plausible than all others, leaving the rest of the preorder the same.

LEARNING VIA BELIEF REVISION

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Every belief-revision method R, together with a prior plausibility \leq generates in a canonical way a learning method L_R^{\leq} called a **belief-revision-based learning method**, and given by:

$$L_R^{\leq}((S, \mathcal{O}), \sigma) := \min_{\leq} R((S, \mathcal{O}, \leq), \sigma).$$

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A. Baltag, N. Gierasimczuk, S. Smets. Truth tracking by belief revision. Studia Logica 2018.

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
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


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


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


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


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
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
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
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IS $\neg O$ OBSERVABLE?

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


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Let S = (S, O) be a negation-closed epistemic space. A stream \vec{O} is **fair** with respect to the world s if \vec{O} is complete wrt s, and contains only finitely many observations O, s.t. $s \notin O$ and every such error is eventually corrected in \vec{O} .

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EXTENDED UNIVERSALITY RESULTS

	Conditioning	Lexicographic	Minimal
Positive	YES	YES	NO
Positive and Negative	YES	YES	NO
Fair Streams	NO	YES	NO

